Last updated Tuesday 30th of January 2024

This post consists of the following sections: “Meaningful versus meaningless”, “Scepticism”, “Our fallibility”, and “The objective distinction between truth and falsehood”.

Meaningful versus meaningless

Suppose I said to you I saw a square triangle and you refused to believe me. Can I then say to you “Just because you haven’t seen a square triangle doesn’t mean they don’t exist.”? This is something that I can say, but, if I say such a thing to you, can what I say be meaningful/understandable? Further suppose I said to you that I have a tenth sense and you refused to believe me. Can I then say to you “Just because you don’t have a tenth sense doesn’t mean that such a thing is impossible.”?

As far as I know, something like a tenth sense is either possible (like a unicorn or a tree) or impossible (like a square that’s triangular, or something that’s nothing, or a possibility that’s impossible). Unlike a tenth sense, I know that a square triangle is impossible. I can meaningfully doubt myself, but I cannot meaningfully/semantically doubt the triangularity of triangle (as in I cannot doubt that by definition a triangle is triangular). This is what I am aware of. It is contradictory for me to say I am unaware of that which I am aware of, and vice versa.

Despite there being a clearly meaningful categorical distinction between something like a tenth sense (an un-known to us) and a square triangle (a known-contradiction), some fail to recognise or acknowledge this distinction. As a result of this, they go on to say contradictory things. On one end of the spectrum you have those that will say it is impossible for you to have a tenth sense (while the matter is unknown to them), on the other end of the spectrum you have those that will say it is possible for you to see a square triangle (perhaps courtesy of an evil demon. They say this despite the matter being a know-contradiction. Perhaps they are just not focused on the matter at hand courtesy of being distracted by an evil demon). The former fail to treat unknowns as unknowns whilst the latter fail to treat contradictions as contradictions. Instead, the former treat unknowns as contradictions whilst the latter treat contradictions as unknowns. Consider the following:

1) What is the difference between “married” and “bachelor”? They both have different letter formations (hence why they are two different words). Also, they both have different meanings (for those who understand the English language).

2) What is the difference between “sdnjkasdnkj” and “gngnrnjgsjnk”? They both have different letter formations. They are both meaningless (they are meaningless to all who have not attached a semantic to “sdnjkasdnkj” and “gngnrnjgsjnk”. It is possible for someone to call something “sdnjkasdnkj”. It is also possible for a language to be formed wherein which “sdnjkasdnkj” and “gngnrnjgsjnk” are both meaningful).

3) What is the difference between “married man” and “single woman”? They both have different word formations. They both have different meanings.

4) What is the difference between “married bachelor” and “triangular square”? They both have different word formations. They are both contradictory. Should we say they both have different meanings?

With 2, there is a difference in how meaninglessness is instantiated, but the meaninglessness the words generate is the same (by this I mean here we can meaningfully distinguish between two words, but not two meanings. Since both words are equally meaningless, the meaninglessness the words generate is the same. Since the two words are different, there is a difference in how meaninglessness is instantiated). With 1, there is both a difference in how meaning is instantiated (different letter formations) and in the meaning the words generate (as in we can meaningfully distinguish between two words and two meanings. Both words are equally meaningful). With 4, there is a difference in how contradiction is instantiated (different meaningful word formations) but the contradictoriness the phrases generate is the same. If we say there is an intelligible difference between a “married bachelor” and a “triangular square”, then this difference is in the combination of semantics used to reach contradiction, not in the contradictoriness that the phrases generate. Contrasting 4 is the use of meaningful words to reach something meaningful (as is the case with 3).

Is there any difference between that which is meaningless (such “adnjkasdnkj” or “ajkalg fnjadnjkf”) and that which is contradictory? That which is contradictory is made up of meaningful words whereas that which is meaningless is not made up of meaningful words. Despite this difference, both are meaningless. This difference may make it harder to see the meaninglessness of contradictions than it is to see the meaninglessness of pure gibberish. More importantly, it may also make the meaninglessness (or non-understandability) of one feel different to the meaninglessness of the other, despite the meaninglessness of both being the same. A “triangular square” is as understandable or imaginable as a “ajkalg fnjadnjkf” (which is not understandable or imaginable at all). There is another category to consider:

5) What is the difference between “tenth sense” and “tenth dimension”? They both have different word formations. They are both unknowns (at least to us me). Should I say they both have different meanings?

Despite being made up of different meaningful words, I cannot say they both have different meanings. I can make sense of ‘sense’ and ‘dimension’, or even ‘third sense’ and ‘third dimension’, but I cannot make sense of “tenth sense” or “tenth dimension”. If I cannot make sense of them, then I cannot describe them as being meaningful/understandable to me. I must therefore describe them as being meaningless to me. Contradictions and unknowns (some matters are unknown but you can form some kind of meaningful conception about them. By unknown I mean something that is like pure gibberish. So whilst “whdif” is made up of letters but amounts to gibberish, “tenth sense” is made up of meaningful words but amounts to gibberish too), are all meaningless to us. We should treat all meaninglessnesses as being equally meaningless. So that which is meaningless as a result of being contradictory, is no more or less meaningless than that which is meaningless to us as a result of being unknown.

A contradiction is that which is meaningless to all and not just us. No alien or god could ever make sense of what it is to sit and stand at the same time. I do not deny that it is unknown to me whether or not they possess senses that could help them make sense of things that I cannot, but this only applies to unknowns (see 5), not contradictions (see 4). Unlike unknowns, contradictions aren’t meaningless because we can’t understand or make sense of them. They are contradictions because we understand a truth and recognise that its rejection is contradictory. For example, nothing can be two different things at the same time (like a square that’s triangular). We understand this as truth, therefore, we understand triangular squares as contradictory precisely because they reject this truth (not because they don’t make sense to us like a tenth sense). Whilst one word can mean two different things, no semantic can be two different semantics (nor can one semantic mean another semantic).

Triangular squares and married bachelors are examples of easily identifiable absurdities/contradictions. They consist of just two words/semantics. There are absurd/contradictory/irrational philosophical arguments wherein which absurdity/contradiction is not as easily identifiable. Before looking at one such example, it is worth reiterating an obvious truth: Whenever something is identified as being contradictory, it must not be treated as an unknown, and it must not be treated as something meaningful. It must be treated as a contradiction. To do otherwise is to be irrational/contradictory or semantically inconsistent.

There is absurdity in the non-absolute sense (such as it being absurd of me to go and poke a wild bear for fun) and absurdity in the absolute sense (such as triangular squares or me successfully believing that I am sat down when I actually believe that I am stood up). In this post, when I use the word “absurd”, I mean to say ‘absolutely absurd’.

Scepticism

Pyrrhonian sceptics adopt the view that there are no truths. Some would describe Pyrrhonian scepticism as the most extreme form of scepticism. But for something to be meaningfully described as ‘the most extreme form of scepticism’, must it not be at least meaningful? Must it be not be semantically consistent?

Accepting Pyrrhonian scepticism as a form of scepticism, is like accepting multishapism geometry (which deals with the study of round squares and triangular pentagons) as a form of geometry. Or it would be like accepting a triangular square as an actual shape. It is viewing something absurd as other than absurd. I will further illustrate why Pyrrhonian scepticism is meaningfully wrong/contradictory/absurd. 

Let’s label that which is always true (for example triangles being triangular) as a basic belief. The Pyrrhonian sceptic asks “If basic beliefs are justified but not by other beliefs, then how are they justified? What else besides beliefs is there that can justify beliefs?”. Some have responded to this question with “our experiences”, but this is a contradictory response. Our experiences perhaps grant us knowledge of, for example, what food we like and don’t like. Our experiences do not make triangles triangular, nor do they make basic beliefs justified. Existence is such that it is It is a basic belief that basic beliefs are justified beliefs (just like how it is a basic belief that triangles are triangular). It is also a basic belief that that which contradicts a basic belief, is a contradictory/unjustified/wrong belief.

The Pyrrhonian sceptic may “argue” that this sort of reasoning is circular. Either the belief ‘triangles are triangular because it’s just the way it is‘ is not a case of circular reasoning, or, it is a case of circular reasoning. If it is a case of circular reasoning (which is dependent on what semantic you focus on when the label/phrase “circular reasoning” is uttered/expressed), then I will proceed to show that circular reasoning is sometimes meaningfully right/consistent/rational/justified and sometimes meaningfully wrong/irrational/inconsistent/contradictory/absurd/unjustified. 

Consider the following:

1) Jack is smiling because he is happy.

2) Triangles are always justified as being understood as shapes because being a shape is a necessary semantical component of being a triangle.

Smiling is not a necessary semantical component of happiness. In other words, it is not absurd for someone to be happy without smiling. If 1 implies smiling is a semantical component of happiness, then 1 is circular (circular in the sense of it’s just the way it is) but absurd. Being a shape is a necessary semantical component of triangles. In other words, it is absurd for something to be triangular without being a shape. If 2 amounts to saying this, then 2 is circular but true. Now consider the following:

3) Basic beliefs are always justified as being understood as always true because being always true is a necessary semantical component of being a basic belief.

4) That is a basic belief because it is always true.

How can we reject our own awareness of the semantic of triangle? How can we reject our own awareness of our own awareness? And how can triangles be considered as meaningful if it is such that it is not true that triangles have three sides? Semantics are neither meaningfully dubitable, nor meaningfully/semantically susceptible to change. Thus, you cannot meaningfully doubt the triangularity of triangle, nor can you meaningfully doubt the semantic of triangle as meaning what it means. Nor can you say “the meaning of triangle might actually mean square” (whilst we can change the word or label we ascribe to a given semantic, we cannot change the semantic itself. This is why we meaningfully have different languages. It is also why one language can be meaningfully translated to another). To say that you can is to say that triangles can be squares. A triangular shape may become a square, but triangles cannot be squares (precisely because they are triangles and therefore not squares). Whilst you may have a 10th sense (may in the sense that I cannot meaningfully rule it out with certainty), you have certainly not seen a triangular square. Similarly, you have certainly not doubted the semantic of triangle as meaning what it means. I acknowledge that I can meaningfully doubt myself to some extent (am I really right about…), but this does not mean that I can meaningfully doubt the triangularity of triangles (nor can I meaningfully doubt another’s awareness of triangle as encompassing ‘three-sided shape’ or meaningfully believe ‘triangle’ as showing up as ‘square’ in the other’s awareness but ‘triangle’ in mine)

The previous paragraph meaningfully showed that if we accept 2 to be true (which we must do if we are semantically-aware of the semantic of triangle), then we must also accept 3 to be true as well (because the semantic of triangle entails that ‘triangles are triangular’ is always true). This means that we accept at least two instances of 4 to be true. The Pyrrhonian sceptic rejects 4 but denies any rejection has occurred on his part (which is clearly a contradiction on his part). What the Pyrrhonian sceptic wants is to refuse to commit to anything (this includes the commitment of refusing to commit to anything, which of course is impossible/absurd for a semantically-aware being to do). The position of truly knowing nothing, can only hold true of sufficiently insentient things like rocks (I am of course assuming that rocks have 0 sentience. Though my assumption is reasonable, rocks having no sentience is not something I can guarantee. But I can guarantee that triangles are triangular). I can say a truly insentient rock truly knows nothing because it is insentient. A self-aware or semantically-aware subject cannot meaningfully believe he knows nothing whilst being aware of semantics. Pyrrhonian scepticism is clearly absurd, therefore, it should not be treated as being meaningful, unknown, or gibberish. It should also not be treated as though it is nothing, it should be treated as absurd. But what about our fallibility?

Our fallibility

Some may argue that our fallibility is such that we may understand something as being absurd, without that thing actually being absurd. Also, we may understand something as being true, without that thing actually being true. I will proceed to show that this is impossible/absurd.

The notion that an evil demon is capable of manipulating me into understanding “something coming from nothing” is false because such a thing is not understandable/meaningful. Me looking as though I’ve been deceived into believing something can come from nothing, is because I have not thought about “nothingness” sufficiently. Perhaps the evil demon has made me mistake a vacuum for “nothingness”. Therefore, whilst I say I believe “something can come from nothing”, what I’m actually understanding or believing, is that something can come from a vacuum. But then how can one understand/believe a vacuum with zero potential as having the potential to produce something? One cannot. Therefore, if I really/meaningfully/truly understand or believe anything, it is that something can come from a vacuum with potential (but then can it be meaningfully classed as a vacuum?). Me labelling the semantic of ‘vacuum with potential’ as “nothing”, does not mean I actually semantically/meaningfully understand something coming from nothing. Alternatively, I’m not meaningfully understanding anything. I’m just uttering words without really knowing what I mean and saying that I believe in them (a robot can be programmed to do this too). 

As long as I understand what ‘somethingness’ and “nothingness” amount to, no matter how hard the evil demon tries, he will never be able to get me to meaningfully believe that something can come from “nothing”. How can I believe something can come from “nothing” whilst knowing what “nothing” is (I know that nothingness is an absurdity. I will illustrate this further on)? If I know what “nothing” is, then I know that something cannot come from it. I cannot be said to have an understanding of “nothing” if I believe something can come from it (similarly, I cannot be said to have an understanding of absurdity if I believe an absurdity such as a “round square” can exist).

Even if I don’t understand what ‘somethingness’ and “nothingness” amount to, the evil demon will still never be able to get me to meaningfully believe something can come from “nothing”. How can I believe something can come from “nothing” without knowing what “nothing” is? I cannot.

Our fallibility is in our use of the wrong labels/words with regards to the semantics we are trying to highlight, or, in feigning understand of a word or theory that we have not understood. Our use of the word “nothing” is a good example of this. How do we know we’re not falsely understanding ‘triangles’ or feigning understanding of them?

With regards to the word “nothing”, there is confusion because of how it is commonly used in a semantically consistent manner. When someone says “there’s nothing here”, they know they don’t mean ‘there’s non-existence here’. They mean ‘nothing relevant here’ or ‘nothing but space here’. Sure, someone can “understand” triangles as being squares as a result of mismatching the label of “triangle” for the semantic of ‘square’ (like a new language learner perhaps), but then we do not call that understanding. We call that misunderstanding. We cannot mistake/misunderstand one semantic for another. For example, we cannot mistake/misunderstand the semantic of three-sided for the semantic of four-sided. We can only misunderstand/mistake which semantic is being focused on or referred to by another person/source (if any semantic is being focused on at all. Advanced robots do not focus on any semantics despite being able to “speak”. Does a computer with audio reading software focus on any semantics when it “reads”? If I play an audio file on my laptop (a song with singing) did my laptop perform it? Was the singer my laptop?). Note that it cannot be that the semantic of triangle is different for you than it is for me. You either have awareness of the semantic of triangle or you don’t. If you have awareness of a different semantic, then you have awareness of a different semantic. Again, the semantic of triangle cannot be the semantic ‘square’ or any other semantic that is not ‘triangle’. One may die and therefore cease to be aware that triangles are triangular (I don’t know if amnesia can be so severe as to make one forget the semantic of triangle), but none can successfully/meaningfully understand a three sided shape as being other than three sided. I do not deny that my imperfect eyes may mistake a trapezium with a very narrow top half for a triangle (which is a case of mistaking a four sided shape for a three sided shape), but this is not a case of me mistaking one semantic for another.

So if we are asked “how do we know we’ve understood what a triangle is?”, the answer is simple: I don’t know if you’ve understood or are semantically-aware of triangle. For all I know you could be a very advanced android, or just a part of a dream that I am having. As for me, if I haven’t understood the semantic of triangle, then I won’t be able to be aware of the semantic of triangle. If I’m aware of the semantic, then I’m aware of the semantic. This is meaningfully undeniable (as in one can absurdly or meaninglessly deny this, but they cannot meaningfully deny it. We can be rational about things, or irrational/absurd. We can do in a way that’s meaningful to us, or we can do in a way that’s meaningfully meaningless/absurd to us). We can look at a more complex example, but the conclusion will be the same.

When people are asked “are all triangles triangular?”, all who understand triangles (as well as the question) will say “yes” (unless they’re joking perhaps). If you ask someone “is water always h2o?”, they will either say “yes”, “no”, or “I don’t know”. If they say “I don’t know” and they are truthful, then either they are admitting that they don’t know if water is h2o (suppose they never heard of h2o), or they are admitting that they haven’t thought about the matter enough or understood the question enough to be able to give a conclusive answer (they may think it’s a trick question, or they may be undecided/unclear if water in dreams is classed as h2o or not, or they may not be sure if the question is exclusively referring to water that’s on our planet). This is not a matter of understanding something true as being false, or vice versa. It is simply an unknown to the person at hand. It is a lack of understanding or the absence of understanding. Despite this lack of understanding, some will inaccurately answer “yes” as opposed to accurately answering “I’m not sure” or “I’m not sure I understand the question”. Again, despite their inaccurate answer, this is not a case of understanding something false as being true. It is a lack of understanding of something.

If someone answers “no”, and you ask them “when is water not h2o?”, and they reply “water in dreams is not h2o”, then you know they understood what you meant by the question because they have given you the truth/semantic in relation to the question you asked of them with regards to the semantics you had in mind when you asked them the question. In other words, given the semantics involved, only one answer from them could have been semantically consistent, and they gave it to you. More specifically, you know their answer was true because describing water in video-games as not being water is absurd (semantically inconsistent). Your question semantically encompassed all forms of water and was labelled “water” as opposed to “the water that x is under the impression of what he rightly or wrongly calls scientists in what he rightly or wrongly calls his waking reality describe as being made up of”.

Despite most (if not all) people acknowledging the existence of water in video-games, some such acknowledging people will answer “yes”. How can one have such an acknowledgement and answer “yes” to the question asked? Provided that one is not forgetful of this acknowledgement, one cannot truthfully answer “yes”. One can either fully understand the question, fully misunderstand the question, partially understand the question, partially misunderstand the question, partially understand and partially misunderstand the question, partially not understand the question, or fully not understand the question (as is the case with a robot or someone who just doesn’t listen to the question at all). Such people cannot fully understand the question and then answer wrongly (unless they want to be absurd/contradictory in the hopes of being funny perhaps, or they are forgetful/unfocused/unmindful of their acknowledgment). I will try to illustrate this further:

For someone to understand water as always being h2o, they’d have to understand h2o as being a necessary semantical component of water (just as they understand three-sidedness as being a necessary semantical component of triangle). Such an understanding of water is impossible/contradictory. Since such an understanding of water is impossible, then the person who answered “yes” to “is water always h2o?”, either understood the question as meaning something else, or they just didn’t understand the question sufficiently (due to a lack of focus perhaps) but feigned understanding. It has to be one or the other, or a mixture of both.

One can wrongly label that which is semantically an a posteriori matter as “an a priori matter”, or that which they think is ‘almost certain’ as “100%”. But one cannot understand the a posteriori and the a priori as being the same. Nor can one understand ‘almost 100%’ and ‘100%’ as being the same. One can label the semantic ‘water that I (whoever or whatever I may truly be) am under the impression of what I rightly or wrongly call scientists in what I rightly or wrongly call my waking reality describe as being made up of’ as “water”, and correctly describe and understand this semantic as containing the semantical component of what they call “h2o”, but this is not the same as one understanding h2o as being a necessary semantical component of water, nor is it the same as the semantic of water being equal to the semantic of h2o. Again, water in video games is not necessarily h2o, but triangles in video games (or anywhere else) are necessarily shapes. Again, it’s either a misunderstanding of labels/words, or a lack of focus on the semantical implications of what is being said.

Where someone attempts to make clear to us the impossibilities or contradictions in a contradictory movie or philosophical argument, we either recognise/understand the contradictions, or don’t. If we don’t recognise the contradictions, no understanding has taken place. So it’s not a case of understanding something false as being true. If we do recognise the contradictions, then understanding has taken place and we recognise something false/absurd as being false/absurd. Alternatively, we just hold a different understanding to what the movie or philosophical argument intended by smuggling in premises or semantics that are not included in the movie or philosophical argument. For example, suppose a “philosophical argument” suggests that married bachelors can exist. If one smuggles in the semantic of ‘a bachelor who pretends to be married’ and attaches it to the label of “married bachelor”, and then expresses agreement with the contradictory philosophical argument, then one has not agreed with the “philosophical argument” because one has not understood the “philosophical argument” to be able to agree with it (they focused on or understood something other than the “philosophical argument”). Alternatively, where no understanding has occurred at all, how can one meaningfully agree with that which they don’t understand? How can one agree with that which is meaningless to them? They can pretend to agree, but they can’t truly agree (they can also truly agree with some parts and pretend to agree with other parts. They can also agree but in a hesitant or not-completely-sure manner. Depends on how clear they are on the matter at hand, or how clear they are on what they want with regards to what they are being offered or exposed to).

Hopefully, what all this shows is that it is impossible/absurd for someone to genuinely understand something as a basic belief, without that thing actually being a basic belief. Sure, we add to our understanding of things, but the things that we genuinely understood before we furthered our understanding, never were contradictory/absurd. How could they be? We’ve always understood triangles as being three-sided shapes. At some point we understood additional truths about them. There can be no additional truth for us to learn that renders triangles as being anything other than three-sided shapes. We know this. Why absurdly treat it as an unknown? Just because we can meaningfully doubt ourselves (is the real me (whatever or whoever it may be) sleeping in the real world and this is just a dream?), doesn’t mean we can meaningfully doubt that triangles are triangular.

The objective distinction between truth and falsehood

Near the beginning of this post I stressed that absurdities should be treated as absurdities, and unknowns should be treated as unknowns. The semantic of unknown (that which we don’t know to be true or false) is clearly distinct from the semantic of absurd (that which we know to contradict a truth or be semantically inconsistent). Either this understanding is in place or it isn’t. If it is in place, then one should treat the absurd as absurd. One should not be insincere to one’s awareness. It is absurd/wrong of one to do so.

It is hypothetically possible to have more than one galaxy or planet , but it is impossible to have more than one “Existence”. By “Existence” with a capital E, I mean that which encompasses absolutely all existents. Without Existence, no Existent would encompass or unify all things/existents into one Existence. This would mean that it is possible for one set of existents to be in existent A, and another set of existents to be in existent B, such that no Existent encompasses A and B. Since no Existent encompasses A and B, this means that non-Existence separates A from B. For non-Existence to separate A from B, it would have to Exist. It is contradictory/absurd (semantically inconsistent) to say non-Existence separates A from B because non-Existence does not Exist for it to do this. Hence the necessary existence of Existence. Semantics exist in Existence, as do imaginary unicorns (I imagined one just now). How real something is in Existence, is another matter.

Absurd statements exist, but what they state is not true of Existence. For example, if I say to you “triangles have four sides” whilst being aware and focused on the semantics of ‘triangle’ and ‘four-sided’, then I have lied to you because I have knowingly described something that contradicts truth as truth. It is not true of the semantic of triangle (which is a part of Existence) that ‘having four sides’ is a semantical component of it. Also, it is not true of the semantic of me (which is also a part of Existence) that it believes triangles to be four-sided. Thus, it is not true of Existence that triangles have four sides, and it is not true of Existence that I (the one that’s having this experience now dream or otherwise) believe triangles have four sides. What is true of Existence is that I have lied to you (if there is a you). Whilst people can be contradictory/absurd, Existence cannot. In other words, whist it is not contradictory/impossible for people to be contradictory, it is contradictory/impossible for Existence to be contradictory.

Triangles have three sides because Existence is the way it is. In other words, Existence is such that triangles are always triangular. Existence is also such that planets aren’t always green. It is Existence that makes semantics true (a priori) and the labels we use for them possible (a posteriori). We are, after all, fully contingent on Existence (as opposed to non-Existence). We are not Existence for us to be able to meaningfully say “it is us who make triangles three-sided as opposed to Existence” or “Existence does not sustain us, we sustain Existence”. We did not get the semantics that we are aware of from non-Existence. When we say round squares are absurd, we are in effect saying Existence is such that round squares are not true of It (you will never see, imagine, or dream of a round square). Every truthful statement we make contains the premise ‘Existence is such that… ‘. On the other hand, every false statement we make inaccurately describes something about Existence. Consider the following definitions/semantics for the words “true” and “false”:

True = That which is in relation to Existence as described or stated. For example “our earth is round”.

False = That which is in relation to Existence not as described or stated. For example “our earth is flat”.

If Existence is such that our earth is round, then the statement “our earth is round” accurately/truthfully describes something in relation to Existence (in this case our earth). This match between how Existence is (specifically that it includes our earth which is round) and the statement, gives the statement the quality of being true or semantically consistent in relation to Existence. If Existence is such that our earth is flat, then the statement “our earth is round” inaccurately/falsely describes something about Existence. This mismatch between how Existence is and the statement, gives the statement the quality of being false or semantically inconsistent in relation to Existence.

True = that which semantically/meaningfully matches how Existence is.

False = that which semantically/meaningfully contradicts Existence.