Last updated 15th of February 2024

This post consists of the following sections: “Hypothetically possible versus hypothetically impossible”, “The things that we know”, “Determined versus random”, “Time travel”, and “Realness”.

Relevant from what was established in “Wrongly embracing absurdities in the name of unknowns, and the indubitable nature of semantics and reason” is the following:

It is hypothetically possible to have more than one galaxy or planet , but it is impossible to have more than one “Existence”. By “Existence” with a capital E, I mean that which encompasses absolutely all existents. Without Existence, no Existent would encompass or unify all things/existents into one Existence. This would mean that it is possible for one set of existents to be in existent A, and another set of existents to be in existent B, such that no Existent encompasses A and B. Since no Existent encompasses A and B, this means that non-Existence separates A from B. For non-Existence to separate A from B, it would have to Exist. It is contradictory/absurd (semantically inconsistent) to say non-Existence separates A from B because non-Existence does not Exist for it to do this. Hence the necessary existence of Existence. Semantics exist in Existence, as do imaginary unicorns (I imagined one just now). How real something is in Existence, is another matter.

It is also important that you acknowledge the following truth before proceeding:

Any belief that is contradictory (such as “circles are triangular”), is not true of Existence.

Hypothetically possible versus hypothetically impossible

Consider what I’m doing now. I am doing activity p (sitting), in location xyz, at time t, in world w. With this being the case, can you meaningfully assert or imagine me doing a different activity q (standing), in the exact same location xyz, at the exact same time t, and in the exact same world w? No because that would amount to you imagining me as sitting and standing at the same time. You cannot imagine this. At best, you can imagine me² doing activity q (standing), in a different but identical location x²y²z², at time t², in a different but identical world w², but certainly not in world w.

The previous paragraph shows that for some reason, we are not able to imagine someone as sitting and standing at the same time. What is it that renders one thought as being contradictory or hypothetically impossible, and another as being meaningful or hypothetically possible? The answer to this question is Existence and non-Existence. With regards to our contradictory thoughts, it is simply the case that they are hypothetically impossible because Existence does not have the potential for them to be true. When I say “Existence does not have the potential”, I do not mean that Existence lacks in potentiality or completeness (on the contrary, I believe Existence encompasses all possibilities/potentialities and is truly completely complete), rather, what I mean to say is that “beyond” Existence or “outside of” Existence, “there is” non-Existence (labelled differently, there is not-true-of-Existence or there is contradictory-to-Existence or hypothetically-impossible). For example, a round square can never exist, therefore, round squares are hypothetically impossible. If it was possible for them to exist, Existence would be such that they would not be meaningfully classed as a hypothetical impossibility (put differently, round squares would belong to Existence as opposed to “belong to” non-Existence). This explains why no being can make sense of them. How can a being make sense of something that has no ties to Existence whilst it is wholly dependent on Existence? There is no non-Existence for something to depend on or drawn anything from.

So with regards to meaningful items of thought such as hypothetical possibilities, semantics, non-absurd theories, and so on, we can say with certainty that the mind isn’t accessing or interacting with non-Existence (again, this is because non-Existence does not exist for it to be accessed or interacted with). We can also say that it’s not creating something from nothing. This means that it’s either creating something from something, or it’s just accessing something that’s already there.

David Hume suggests that all our items of thought are constructed from simple concepts that we have attained through experience. For example, we experience shapes by seeing them, and we acquire them through this experience. Infinity is not an absurd concept. It has clear semantical value. Unless we can say we have experienced infinity, Hume’s empirical approach won’t work here (but Hume had something to say about this which I will discuss in the next paragraph). Where does infinity come from? What makes it possible for us to have awareness of such a semantic? As with everything, Existence (as opposed to non-Existence) makes it possible for us to have awareness of infinity.

Hume argued that infinity is the negation of finite. We acquire awareness of finite by seeing finite things, and acquire awareness of infinity by negating finite. Thus, infinity is linked to Existence via finite. But how would this negation work? Semantically/rationally speaking, If you were to negate the boundaries of anything, you would either be left with the non-existence of that thing, or a smaller version of that thing. If existence was finite and you were to negate it, you would be left with non-existence, not something infinite. On the other hand, if you were to negate all finite things within an infinite existence, then all you would be left with is the infinite existence. But this is still not the same as “negating X results in an infinite X” (which is what Hume appeared to have had in mind). Y is infinite, X is finite. Negating the boundaries of X results in the non-existence of X and the continued existence of Y. Or alternatively, it results in an even smaller version of X, and the continued existence of Y. What it does not result in is the non-existence of Y, and the existence of an infinite X. Hume’s belief that we obtained infinity from finite, is clearly absurd/false/contradictory.

If we are to say that our minds have constructed the concept of infinity, with what have they constructed it with? We know that we cannot count or add to infinity (we can try, but we will never reach infinity). Is this truth something that our minds have constructed on their own, or is it simply a truth/aspect of Existence that we are aware of (just as 1 + 1 = 2 is a truth of Existence)? Clearly, when it comes to infinity, it’s not that the mind creates something from something (we do not create the semantic of infinity from the semantic of finite), it’s more a case of it focusing on or being aware of something.

Since nothing can become infinite (you can expand to infinity but you will never become infinite. You can count to infinity but you will never reach infinity), and since only Existence has always existed and will always exist (the alternative is to contradictorily say something can come from nothing or that something can go into nothing even though there is no nothing for something to come from or go into), Existence is necessarily infinite. If we don’t view Existence as being infinite, then we cannot explain infinity in terms of Existence because that would mean nothing infinite has ever existed or could ever exist (which is the same as saying infinity is hypothetically impossible). How could we who are wholly contingent on Existence, make any sense of infinity if Existence is finite? How can a finite existence conceive of an infinite existence independently of an infinite existence? From where has this finite existence gotten its conception from? Has it gotten it from non-Existence?

If infinity is a hypothetical impossibility, then it should be an irrational concept like “round-square“. It might be objected here that whilst all contradictions are impossibilities, not all impossibilities are contradictions. Just as ‘shape with interior angles totalling 180 degrees’ and ‘triangle’ denote the same thing, ‘hypothetically impossible’ and ‘contradictory’ also denote the same thing. What is the difference between them? Is it not the case that when we find a proposition to be hypothetically impossible we label it as being not-true-of-Existence or absurd/contradictory/false? And is it not the case that when we find a proposition to be contradictory we find it to be an impossibility? My friend says that I’m at the park right now despite me being at home. It’s absurd/false/irrational/impossible for me to be at the park and at home at the same time. It is not true of Existence that I’m at the park when I’m at home (unless I have one foot in the park and one foot in my home. Still, the whole of me cannot be at home whilst the whole of me is at the park when the park isn’t my home, or my home isn’t in the park).

Infinity solves a lot of problems for us. If we were to view Existence as infinite, then all hypothetical possibilities truly become hypothetically possible. This is because there is infinite potential (I would call this Omnipotence) available for any given state of affairs, worlds, or beings to occur. In other words, in an infinite existence, all hypothetical possibilities exist such that they can all come to attain reality (this does not mean that they necessarily will. Will attain reality and can attain reality are two different truths/semantics.). Which is the same as saying all hypothetical possibilities truly are hypothetically possible. Now consider the alternative: Not all hypothetical possibilities can come to attain reality (again, note that this is not the same as saying not all hypothetical possibilities will come to attain reality or truth). Which is the same as saying not all hypothetical possibilities are truly hypothetically possible. If x can’t ever be brought about or come to attain reality (like a round-square), then how can x be considered as hypothetically possible? Shouldn’t it be considered as hypothetically impossible? If something is hypothetically possible, then it truly is a hypothetical possibility. We cannot meaningfully say if something is hypothetically possible, then it may be a hypothetical possibility. It either is or it isn’t. This is different to saying something like “it’s possible for a being with a 10th sense to exist”. When we say 10th sense, we don’t have enough information to classify as hypothetically possible or impossible. A 10th sense is an unknown to us. It is not a known hypothetical possibility to us. So we should not be saying a 10th sense is hypothetically possible. We should be saying a 10th sense is an unknown to us. Similarly, we don’t have enough information to know if our Tom Cruise (the one in our world) is filming right now. This is just another example of an unknown, but unlike a 10th sense, it is not as unknown to us. We can have some reasonable assumptions about Tom Cruise (one such reasonable assumption is that he was born in America. The assumption is reasonable for us (or at least me) given our (or at least my) empirical observations), but we cannot have any reasonable assumptions about a 10th sense.

Given the necessity of an infinite existence, and the semantical/rational/logical implications of an infinite existence, it is clear that our minds never create something from something (by this I mean it is not our minds that render a concept as meaningful or hypothetically possible, it is Existence). They simply access, or focus on, or experience one of an endless number of hypothetical possibilities (all of which are made possible by the nature of Existence). Clearly, unicorn is a meaningful concept. Unicorns-as-real-as-our-horses is a meaningful concept too. It doesn’t matter that we reached the concept or semantic of unicorn or unicorn-as-real-as-our-horses by combining other concepts or semantics. I constructed the concept of tyrhorn (which denotes a tyrannical round square with horns and wings) from multiple concepts too, but somehow, unicorn instantiates clear meaning, whilst tyrhorn instantiates clear absurdity. We know that no being can make sense of tyrhorn, but we can make clear sense of unicorn. We must rationally account for why this happens. In other words, we must explain why this happens in terms of (or in relation to) Existence. Our task is simple: Since it is clearly absurd for Existence to be finite, it is clear that all meaningful things are meaningful as a result of Existence being what It is (infinite). A finite existence cannot accommodate an infinite number of semantics (or possibilities), and something cannot come from non-Existence. 

I have talked more about Existence than non-Existence. I will now talk more about non-Existence. Non-Existence is the negation or absence of Existence (which is contradictory/irrational/impossible). When one tries to think of nothing, they probably think of a vacuum (which is not nothing). Non-Existence is the very definition of false/absurd or not true of Existence. Married bachelors are non-Existent or not true of Existence. Non-Existence is non-Existent or not true of Existence. If I meaningfully say I know what “absolute nothingness” or “married bachelors” are, then I’m saying I know they are absurdities. I’m saying I know that they are things that are not true of Existence. What I am not saying is that they are things that are true of Existence that I or some other being have made sense of. It would be absurd/contradictory of me to say this.

We are rationally obliged to acknowledge that a Tom Cruise can fly because we know the proposition is meaningful (therefore it is not an impossibility). Do we have the same rational authority to say “our Tom Cruise, the one in our world, can fly”? Could there be premises in place unknown to us that render such a thing as absurd? The answer to this question will hopefully become clearer and clearer in the posts that follow.

The things that we know

Consider the following four categories:

1) Things that we know to be hypothetically possible (such as me raising my hand in the next second).

2) Things that we know to be true (such as triangles having three sides).

3) Things that we know to be hypothetically impossible (such as a triangle having four sides).

4) Things that we know we don’t know to be true, hypothetically possible, or hypothetically impossible (such as a 10th sense, or Brazil will win the next World Cup, or I will raise my hand in the next second).

Regarding the first three categories, we know the truth in relation to Existence. As in we know that Existence is such that my hand can (but not necessarily will) be raised in the next second, or that It is such that triangles have three sides, or that It is such that It does not include four-sided triangles. Regarding the fourth category, we don’t have the truth or knowledge in relation to Existence, and we know this. As in we know Existence is such that we are such that there are things about Existence that we don’t know.

Assume we don’t know if time travel is hypothetically possible or not. Now compare the following two sentences:

A) It’s possible that time travel is hypothetically possible.

B) It’s unknown whether time travel is hypothetically possible or not.

There is no difference between something that’s possible and something that’s hypothetically possible. My usage of the phrase “hypothetically possible” instead of the word “possible” in A, was intended to highlight the difference between the two different semantical usages of the word “possible”. In one usage, “possible” is used to highlight our ignorance of something in relation to Existence. In another usage, “possible” is used to highlight our awareness/knowledge of something in relation to Existence. In the statement “it’s possible that time travel is possible“, the first “possible” highlights our ignorance about something in relation to Existence (does it include within it the potential for time travel?), whilst the second ‘possible‘ highlights true potentiality or possibility. A possibility (something that we know can attain reality in Existence) can be contrasted with an unknown (something that we don’t know can attain reality (like a 10th sense), or, something that we don’t know will attain reality (like our hands being raised in the next minute), or, something that we don’t know to be real/true or not real/true in relation to us (did I take out the trash?) or Existence (does Existence have more dimensions than I currently know?) or anything in It (are there unicorns in our galaxy?).

Unicorns exist at least as meaningful imaginary animals, whereas round-squares don’t exist as imaginary shapes because round-squares are not rational/meaningful shapes for one to be able to access via the imagination or otherwise. Put differently, Existence is such that there’s no such thing as a round-square, therefore, round-squares are hypothetically impossible (objectively/necessarily not true of Existence). There being unicorns on our planet is subjectively not true of Existence (as in we as subjects have this interpretation of our planet, but because we lack omniscience with regards to what’s on our planet, or because we have not empirically verified what’s on our planet in an absolute manner or received knowledge about it from an absolute source, we do not know if it is absolutely true or false that there are unicorns on our planet. We think it’s probably true that there aren’t unicorns on our planet). The claim “there are no unicorns on our planet” is an educated guess/assumption by us. It is not knowledge that we have. It is knowledge that any being that has omniscience with regards to our planet has. We do know triangles have three sides. We don’t know if there are unicorns on our planet. We assume there aren’t (but I think it’s safe to say that it’s a reasonable assumption by us given what we have been exposed to and our limitations to further empirically verify. In contrast to this, I think it is probably unreasonable for us to assume that the earth is flat or that our neighbours are androids. Of course, it’s not hypothetically impossible for someone to have been exposed to something that we have not that would make it reasonable for them to assume that their neighbours are androids or that the earth is flat). There is a clear distinction between what we know and what we assume. There is also a difference between what is reasonable and what is reasonable, and what is unreasonable and what is unreasonable.

Determined versus random

Suppose we have a random number generator that can only be used once. It is definitely going to be used and it can generate any number from 1 to 100. Whilst any of these 100 hypothetical possibilities can come to attain reality, only one of these 100 hypothetical possibilities will come to attain reality. My friend and I are in the same world as the number generator. My friend has some knowledge of the future of this world such that he knows exactly what number the random number generator is going to generate (it will generate the number 19). He says “there aren’t 100 hypothetical possibilities that can come to attain reality in relation to what the random number generator is going to generate. There is only one.”. As far as he’s concerned, the other 99 hypothetical possibilities are actually impossibilities because they will not attain reality. Who is right? Me who believes in 100 hypothetical possibilities, or my friend who believes in one?

Compare and contrast two different number generators that can only be used once. Both generate the number 19. One was set to generate the number 19 in a determined manner, whilst the other was set to generate any number from 1 to 100 in a random manner. This literally means that whilst it (the random number generator) could have generated only one number (call this layer 1), that number could have been any number from 1 to 100 (call this layer 2). This is the same as saying any number from 1 to 100 was hypothetically possible for the random number generator to generate. Denying this would be an utter disregard for the semantics and the mechanisms involved in the numbers being generated. Knowledge of the future does not alter the mechanisms involved in the numbers being generated. One future outcome does not render all past possible outcomes as not being possible at that past point in time.

So, that the random number generator will generate the number 19, is not just a hypothetical possibility as far as my friend is concerned. It’s a reality/truth in relation to our world whose time has not yet been reached. A hypothetical possibility that has not attained reality/truth yet (but certainly will). So my friend isn’t just aware of what is hypothetically possible and what is not hypothetically possible in relation to the random number generator (we became aware of this when we read the instruction manual for the random number generator which stated “this random number generator can only generate one number from 1 to 100, and we guarantee that it really is random”). My friend somehow became aware of which hypothetical possibility will come to attain reality/truth. Again, this awareness does not render the non-reality attaining hypothetical possibilities as being hypothetically impossible at that past point in time. Back then they were hypothetically possible, now they are hypothetically impossible.

At the risk of being repetitive, further compare and contrast the following two sentences with regards to two number generators that can only be used once:

Sentence A: 100 hypothetical possibilities can come to attain reality and 1 (the number 19 being generated) will come to attain reality.

Sentence B: 1 hypothetical possibility (the number 19 being generated) can come to attain reality, and it will come to attain reality.

Both sentences A and B accurately describe the truth with regards to the state of two number generators before and after generating their number. If we focus on the future aspect of their respective timelines, the truth is such that they both generate the number 19. The truth is also such that at this future point in time, all 100 hypothetical possibilities from sentence A, and the 1 hypothetical possibility from sentence B are no longer hypothetically possible because the past cannot occur in the future, and their time has passed. This does not mean that they have ceased to exist in Existence. The past does not go out of Existence, therefore, those past hypothetical possibilities also do not go out of Existence. This is why we are meaningfully able to say it was hypothetically possible. If those past hypothetical possibilities weren’t/aren’t/won’t be in Existence, no being would ever be able to talk about them at all because it would be a case of something coming from non-Existence. This is why we can imagine a different past to the one that actually/really/truly occurred for us. Different pasts truly were hypothetically possible for us. We can also imagine different futures that haven’t occurred for us.

Some may still argue that “since it was determined beforehand that the random number generator was going to generate the number 19, the number 19 wasn’t randomly generated. Where all things are pre-determined, randomness is absurd.”. The question worth asking here is is there a difference between something being known in advance, and something being pre-determined?

Consider our ability to choose. For God who knows all that is knowable, it is determined/known that I’m going to choose y in circumstance x. This is a hypothetical possibility to me who’s truth is unknown to me, and a hypothetical possibility to God who’s truth is known to God. It’s a hypothetical possibility who’s truth is unknown to me in that I don’t know what I would choose in circumstance x despite knowing what I can choose in circumstance x. It’s a hypothetical possibility to God who’s truth is known to God in that God knows I can, and will choose y in circumstance x.

If God brings about circumstance x, I choose y (which could be interpreted to mean that I was determined to choose y and this was not a random choice. This is not unlike me being determined to choose to do things that I think are morally good (if I’m determined to choose to be good that is). Some people are really strong-willed and determined on some matters, undecided or weak-willed on others, and some people just choose for no reason or cause whatsoever. Hopefully this post will show that a choice that is based on nothing, is a random choice). Can one non-absurdly say that I did not choose? The hypothetical possibility semantically/meaningfully contains the word choose such that its rejection nullifies the semantical gap assigned to subjects that don’t have a choice (if one is absolutely oppressed, then one has absolutely no choice), or things that do something without a will (like a robot). This is the first indication of it being true that I chose. If God does not bring about circumstance x, then the aforementioned hypothetical possibility does not change. As in it remains true of Existence that at that point in time, if I was exposed to circumstance x, I would have chosen y. But it may be that at a different point in time, if I am/was exposed to x, I would not choose y (as a child I would do some things that I would not do as an adult). Let’s go back to number generators. The number generators that will be discussed in the proceeding paragraphs can be used endlessly.

God knows that it is determined that potentially random number generator r, will generate the number 19 at time t. But this is not because it has been set/determined to generate the number 19 at time t. This is because it will randomly generate the number 19 at time t (so it will not generate the number 19 because it will be time t, rather, it will generate a number randomly at time t and that number will be 19). Where r generate its numbers such that external factors (call this e) such as temperature, place, day, time, and so on have no effect on how r is generating its numbers, and no internal factors (call this i) such as being internally programmed to generate the number 19 after every four numbers randomly generated, then r can be said to be generating its numbers in a random manner. Where a specific temperature, day, time, or location results in r generating a specific number as opposed to a random number (for example, r always generates the number 19 in the kitchen, or it always generates the number 19 at 19:00), then r is not a wholly random number generator. Thus, where something like a change in r’s location alters how r generates its numbers (in this case moving r to the kitchen), then r’s manner of generating its numbers is changed by a change in its location. But a change in r’s location can only meaningfully impact r’s manner of generating its numbers if there is some meaningful thing about this new location that effects r’s manner of generating its numbers. It also means there either was, or there has come to be something internal/inherent about r that clicks with this new location, such that r no longer generates its numbers in a completely random manner. The former is not absurd in any way. The latter can either be interpreted as absurd, or non-absurd. It is absurd in the sense that going from absolute randomness to any level of determinedness, means the potential/possibility to become determined was actually always inherently there. It is not absurd in the sense that r was truly/absolutely random (because it had 0 inherent potential for determinedness), but some external force inserted something into it that changed it internally or inherently, such that when its location was changed, it would click with that location, whereas before, it wouldn’t. Hopefully what this paragraph shows is that if it (the number a number generator generates, or the choice a person makes) is based on or because of something, then it’s not random. It may also be worth adding that if r generated its numbers wholly based on e whilst e is wholly random, then the numbers that r generates are wholly random. As for whether r itself is wholly random or not, I would argue that it is not wholly random because ‘being wholly dependent on e‘ cannot be viewed as a random thing. Someone might then argue that whether one is wholly dependent on e, or whether one is a cat, or whether x is the case or y is the case could all be just random. Indeed, if there is no reason for why x is the case as opposed to y, then it is random that x is the case as opposed to y. But if there is a reason, then it is not random. In a truly perfect existence, everything exists because of (and for) a truly perfect existence. In a truly random existence, it is truly random what anything exists because of (or for). As for in an evil existence…

So long as its interior angles add up to exactly 180 degrees, x is absolutely/perfectly/truly triangular. So long as it is generating numbers in a purely random manner, r is absolutely/perfectly/truly random in generating numbers (there is a difference between that which is completely/absolutely random, and that which generates its numbers in a completely/absolutely random manner. There is also a difference between that which is completely/absolutely determined, and that which generates its numbers in a completely/absolutely determined manner. I will highlight this difference further on). It is truth/reality that the semantics of ‘random’ and ‘triangular’ are both indestructible/immutable (as are all other semantics in Existence, and Existence Itself). It is also truth that a triangular machine, or a random number generating machine, are both mutable or destructible.

God knows that it is determined that determined number generator d, will always generate the number 19. In this case, d is maximally determined, and g is irrelevant to d’s inherent nature (unless of course d’s inherent nature is changed to something else, but by g here I mean external factors clicking with d’s inherent nature, not external factors inserting something into d and changing d to something else). You can have a maximally random number generator where it generates its numbers based on nothing internal or external, and a maximally determined number generator with the determination either being wholly internal, external, or a mixture of both. You can also have all that is in between randomness and determinedness. Consider the following spectrum:

Random——————-semi-random/semi-determined——————-Determined

The number generator that will be discussed now is able to generate any number hypothetically possible:

Perhaps the closest to Random semi-random number generator (call any semi-random number generator s-r), will almost always generate its numbers randomly. There could be one g wherein which it will generate a specific number (let’s say the number 19) purely as a result of this specific g. Call this one specific g “gx” or “external circumstance x” but don’t take it as an absolute specific (so instead of it being one absolutely specific Sunday, it is all hypothetically possible Sundays on September 19th, 2021, rooted in world w). This nearly Random s-r will always generate the number 19 in gx, but it will generate any number randomly in all other gs (external circumstances). But wouldn’t this s-r be even closer to Random if instead of generating the number 19 at gx, it generated any number but 19 at gx? Because if it generates any number at gx, then it would be Random. But if it generates any number but 19 at gx, then surely it is not as Random. As in there is a reason for why it refuses to generate 19 at gx. But wouldn’t this s-r be even closer to Random if instead of generating any number but 19 at gx, it had something like a 1% chance of being in the mode of generating any number but 19, and a 99% chance of being in the mode of generating any number?

Suppose an s-r is guaranteed to generate only one number a day. Further suppose gx is Sunday September 19th 2021 in world w, and that gx* is any absolutely specific gx. So there is one gx, and an endless number of gx*s. Can we say something like: s-r has a 1% chance of being in the mode of generating any number but 19, and a 99% chance of being in the mode of generating any number randomly in each gx*? No, because unlike each gx (which encompasses an endless number of gx*s), each gx* does not encompass anything other than itself. One gx*, one assigned generated number to that gx*. An endless number of gx*s, an endless number of assigned generated numbers to those gx*s (one assigned to each gx*). If we say s-r has a 99% chance of generating randomly and a 1% chance of generating semi-randomly in gx (gx is one layer higher than gx*), then that is still problematic/inadequate because we need to be one layer higher than gx for this to be possible. We need something that encompasses an endless number of gxs such that in 1% of the gxs, it will generate any of its numbers but 19, whilst in the other 99% of the gxs, it will generate any of its numbers. I believe now, the following needs to be highlighted:

The reason we are able to say “s-r can generate any number, but at gx it will generate any number but 19″ is because: Of the endless number of gx*s, there is one number assigned to each gx* with the exception of the number 19. Of course, this then raises the following question: Given what has been outlined so far, if 19 is not assigned to a gx*, does a completely new number take its place? Or is one hypothetically possible number assigned to two gx*s in gx? The answer can’t be the former because earlier on I stated that “the number generator that will be discussed now is able to generate any number hypothetically possible“. Any number hypothetically possible means the list of numbers is exhausted (or truly complete) such that no new number is hypothetically possible. The quantity of complete/true infinity cannot be viewed as less than truly/completely infinite, but it must also be such that one does not confuse the quantity of complete infinity with the quantity of “beyond complete infinity”. The latter is absurd (and therefore not a quantity at all) whereas the former is truth. The only thing that is able to encompass all hypothetically possible numbers existents, is Existence/Infinity. This s-r cannot be Existence in the same way that a part of Existence cannot be the whole of Existence. For more on this point consider the last two sections of this post (if you are familiar with Russell’s paradox, then it might be worth your while to consider the whole of the post linked).

Note that how many hypothetical possibilities is tied to a thing is dependent on what that thing is in. For example, a number generator is in world w. If there aren’t as many possible world ws as there are as many possible numbers that the number generator in world w can generate, then this is contradictory because the number generator is a part of world w. However, since world w is a part of Existence, and the number generator is also a part of Existence, it follows that it is hypothetically possible for the number generator in world w to generate any number hypothetically possible. This is because Infinity/Existence accommodates both world w and the number generator in world w. Infinity/Existence is the reason for why something can go on forever, or for why there can be an endless number of a given thing (the exception to this is Existence because there cannot be more than one Existence). This does not mean that the thing that goes on forever is Infinite. Nor does it mean that the quantity of that which you can have an endless number of, is Infinity. Again, a part of Existence/Infinity does not equal to the whole of Existence/Infinity.

A number generator that is able to generate only two numbers, but does so in an absolutely random manner, is still absolutely random relative to its potential. However, its unpredictability or randomness is not with as much depth and breadth as a number generator that generates three numbers in an absolutely random manner (because it is potentially less random in the sense that it has less numbers to generate in an absolutely random manner). Thus, whilst both number generators can be said to be absolutely random in the manner in which they are generating their numbers, the one with three numbers is harder to correctly guess with regards to what number it will generate next. There is less room for error regarding the former, hence the justification for describing it as being easier to guess with regards to what number it will generate next despite it being absolutely random in how it generates its numbers. Of course, neither of these two random number generators are truly completely random (their inherent potential for randomness is limited due to the limited number of possibilities they encompass) and the potential for randomness with greater depth and breadth exists in Existence. Only that which possesses all possibilities (as opposed to just two or three) can (but not necessarily will) be truly completely random.

Similarly, a number generator that is able to generate only two numbers, but does so in an absolutely determined manner, is still absolutely determined relative to its potential. However, its determinedness is not with as much depth and breadth as a number generator that generates three numbers in an absolutely determined manner (because it is potentially less determined in the sense that it has less numbers to generate in an absolutely determined manner). Thus, whilst both number generators can be said to be absolutely determined in the manner in which they generate their numbers, the one with three numbers has one more thing determined about it than the one with two numbers. It’s like saying the one with three numbers is a “bigger determined thing” (as far as generating numbers goes) than the one with two numbers (despite both being absolutely determined). Of course, neither of these two determined number generators are truly completely determined (their inherent potential is limited due to the limited number of possibilities they encompass) and the potential for greater determinedness exists in Existence. Only that which possesses all possibilities (as opposed to just two or three) can (but not necessarily will) be truly completely determined.

In a truly perfect existence, it is not random that everything that happens is perfection. This does not mean that there has to be no choice or freewill or randomness available in a truly perfect existence. If one can choose between more than one perfect occurrence, then one has a choice of more than one perfect thing happening. Whichever one one chooses, will be perfect. As for which choice is to be made, this could be wholly random (as in there is no reason for why x was chosen instead of y) or wholly determined (despite both choices being perfect, x was determinedly chosen instead of y). Note that if choices x and y are perfect but one determinedly chose x over y as opposed to randomly, then there must be a reason/determination for why this has happened. At the very least, it must be said that between x and y, the subject viewed one as more perfect to choose than the other. As for why one was more perfect for the subject than the other, could this be random? Perhaps it could be determined in that one choice was more in line with a truly perfect existence for the subject than the other (but as for why, again, could this be random? Is it random that one’s favourite colour is red whilst another’s is yellow?). As for how x and y could still be perfect occurrences either way, it must be said that the subject is imperfect/incomplete/inadequate to fail to recognise both choices as perfect, or that whilst both occurrences would have been perfect objectively speaking (as in both occurrences would have been such that Existence would not have become imperfect), one was better for the subject than the other (for whatever reason).

The closest to determined semi-determined number generator (call any semi-determined number generator s-d), will almost always generate the number 20. Suppose a number generator generates 20 in all gs, except at gx it generates 19. We cannot describe this number generator as being random in any way (so it is not an s-d at all). It is fully determined to generate 20 and 19 in a determined manner.

Call Sunday 19/9/2021 rooted in world w “gx”, and any absolutely specific gx “gx*”. Where s-d generates either 20 or 19 in gx, then p percent of gx (that’s p percent of all gx*s) consists of 19, whilst the other percentage consists of 20. Hence the semi-randomness. With this being in place, we can describe this number generator as an s-d. The smaller the p, the closer this s-d is to being maximally determined to generate 20. Put differently, the greater the odds of this s-d generating 20 at gx, the closer it is to being absolutely determined to generate 20.

Time travel

The truth about Existence is such that in the next second, I can raise my hand in the kitchen. If I do this, then the hypothetical possibility of ‘p doing action q in location xyz at time t’ will have attained reality. Which would mean the statement ‘p did action q in location xyz at time t is the truth/reality‘ will come to be true of Existence after I raise my hand. If I do not do this, then that hypothetical possibility will not attain reality/truth, and that statement will not be true of Existence.

Suppose I am such that in addition to being able to go back to any location xyz in the world that I am in, I am also able to physically (not just mentally) go back to any time t in the world that I am in. Further suppose I raise my hand in the next second such that ‘p did action q at location xyz at time t’ attained reality/truth. I then desire for this hypothetical possibility (p doing action q at location xyz at time t) to attain reality again. So I physically go back in time in an attempt to raise my hand again when that time comes. Wouldn’t that mean that I would find my past self sitting there? If I ask him to move in order to take his place and raise my hand, it is no longer the same hypothetical possibility attaining reality. Even if the past me moved over and I raised my hand in the exact same place, time, and manner to how the past me raised his hand, there is still a difference in what has attained reality/truth. There is a difference between the present me and the past me such that the p that’s tied to me (or rooted in me) is not absolutely the same as the p that’s tied to the past me. The p in relation to the past me does not semantically encompass ‘he is physically travelling back in time‘, whereas the p in relation to the present me does. This clear difference in whose hand is being raised means that the hypothetical possibilities are not the same. If I went back in time purely as an invisible observer, what then?

If I go back in time to before the hypothetical possibility occurs or attains reality in relation to me, then at that past point in time that I’m in, the truth is such that the hypothetical possibility has not yet attained reality in relation to me. But has it attained truth/reality in relation to me? Since the hypothetical possibilities are not the same (because in one version it includes me being there, and in another it doesn’t), the answer is no. Furthermore, for me to go back in time to raise my hand a second time at that point in time, would amount to me raising my hand twice at the same time (which is contradictory because you cannot raise your hand twice at the same time. You raise it the first time, then you raise it a second time at a different time to the first time). Time travel (the one where you go back in time to change the future you really came from) is clearly contradictory.

Clearly, the past cannot occur in the future and the future cannot occur in the past (unless you argue something like “the effects from the future and the past are projected/trickled onto the present, and this creates some sort of an effect of the past occurring in the future and vice versa) therefore, time travel is absurd. If time travel is to have any semantically consistent value in relation to its label, then I believe the following is it:

From the present to the past: The present me can enter another world that is identical to the world the past me occupied, and then start interacting with it.

From the future to the present: If a future “me” comes to me now and tells me that he is me from the future, I would know a priori that he doesn’t mean from the same world. The future “me” from the other world, is from a world identical to the one I would have found myself in had the future “me” not interfered. Though we’re not truly/really the same being (perhaps like how no two right angled triangles being drawn (with one half completely drawn and the other three quarters completely drawn) are truly/really the same triangle), the future “me” a posteriori knows what kind of life I would have had had he not interfered. This a posteriori knowledge is possible here because everything about our two worlds is identical, right up until the point the future “me” interacts with me.

So, where the future “me” does interact with me, it is no longer hypothetically possible for me to be identical to the future “me”. Where the future “me” is just an invisible observer that does not alter the course of events in my world beyond just being there invisibly, then I am guaranteed to continue to be identical to the future “me”. Given the infinite regress that can follow from this, there will have to be one original me that never had a future “me” observe “itself”. There will have to be an original world from which the original me originated from.

From the past into the future: Either such a thing is contradictory, or the same principle applies but in reverse. If a past “me” comes to me now and tells me he’s from the past, I would at first think that he is probably mistaken because I have no memories of visiting a “me” that I am identical to now. But just as I necessarily stop being identical to the future “me” after he interacts with me, the past “me” necessarily stopped being identical to me after he differed to my past. Clearly, both the past “me” and the future “me” are not truly/really me. Despite this, it appears to me that I have a closer resemblance to the future “me” because I would have definitely become identical to the future “me” had the future “me” been entirely invisible when travelling back in time to my world to see me. The past “me” would not have become identical to me unless he somehow travelled to the future my world to see me as an invisible observer, and then travelled back in time to the world he came from, and then suffered an appropriate and adequate amount of amnesia. This would then mean that the present me identically did all these things but just can’t remember. No amnesia is required of a future “me” for us to be identical. All other things being equal, the more memories I have of myself, the more I am me (or the greater I am in me-ness). If chunks of my memory have been erased, then arguably, chunks of me (or at least what makes me me) have been erased.

Regarding the future “me” visiting the present me, I said: Given the infinite regress that can follow from this, there will have to be one original me that never had a future “me” observe “itself”. Regarding the past “me” visiting the present me, I will say: Given the infinite regress that can occur from this, there would have to be one original me that never had a future me to go to. But this seems problematic. An original me has a past to go to but no future to go to. A future “me” will be based on what a past/present me will do. If there is no past/present me, what is a future “me” based on? This by definition makes the ties less real.

In the case of a future “me” visiting the present me, it’s as if something has been filled in by “me” and revisited. In the case of the past “me” visiting the present me, it’s as if something that has not been filled in by “me” has been visited. For a past “me” to visit a future me, “extra intervention” is necessary, whereas for a future “me” to visit a present me, “extra intervention” is not necessary because the original me could have discovered “time travel to the past” on his own as he moved though time, and then started the chain of the present me that is visited by the invisible future “me”. Of course, it would still be the case that this original “me” is different to all the other me(s) that had a future “me” observe them. If anyone is interested in religion/scripture, then perhaps the following say something with regards to some of the things discussed in this post: Quran 18:51 and 5:117, and, Hebrews 3 and 4.

Realness

All potential items of thought and experience are in Existence at all times. As for who is imagining what or thinking about what, that’s a different matter. There is also the matter of who is experiencing what and how real that experience is. We make a distinction between what we call “our waking experiences” and what we call “our dream experiences”. We generally believe the former to be real. As for the latter, you’ve perhaps heard of someone comforting someone else who woke up from a nightmare saying “it wasn’t real, it was only a dream”. Nightmares or dreams cannot be said/interpreted to have no reality whatsoever. If you experience x, then x is a real experience for you. How truly/potently/completely real the experience is, is another matter. So long as the empirical (or the a posteriori) is interpreted in line with pure reason (or definitional/semantical truths or the a priori) such that it does not contradict the a priori, we have no rationally/semantically inconsistent beliefs/theories/interpretations/statements.

As far as we know a posteriori, all virtual reality games (such as those playable on a vr device) are designed by some game designer or developer who uses software to build them. The games are made accessible once the relevant device has been turned on, and they are accessed once the software is run and the headset is put on. Thus, with regards to virtual reality games, we have an a posteriori understanding of how they are made and how they are instantiated. Can we say we have an a posteriori understanding of how our waking experiences are instantiated? With regards to an a posteriori understanding of how our dreams are instantiated, we recognise we need to be asleep relevant to what we call our real world. That’s all we really know a posteriori. Who designs or builds the dream worlds? What gives them their quality of realness? Is how real a dream experience is purely based on the quality of reality with which the dream is made up of, or is it also dependent on the quality of the awareness/consciousness/senses of the subject?

Can we describe virtual reality as a kind of reality? Not really. But if some “virtual” world (like the one that is depicted in the movie “The matrix”) felt as real as our real world, we’d have to describe it as feeling equally real. And if the “virtual” world felt more real than our real world, we’d have to describe it as feeling more real than our real world. In that scenario, wouldn’t we have to describe the mechanism cause that takes us from our less real “real” world to the more real “virtual” world as a bridge between that which is less real to that which is more real? Wouldn’t our standards have to shift such that we label the “virtual” world as our real world, and our “real” world as our virtual less real world? Perhaps a less real reality will feel more real to a subject whose make up is designed to more real-ly click with that reality than a more real reality. Or perhaps no realer reality will feel less real than a less real reality no matter what the subject. As for the causes that cause one’s experiences to go from more real to less real or vice versa, that’s beyond the scope of this post.

For any given subject, real potent happiness, fulfilment, satisfaction, and pleasure, is better than pretend/illusory or weak versions of those things (though some level of happiness and satisfaction is better than no level of happiness or satisfaction. Thus, it is better to be somewhat happy and satisfied, than to not exist at all). The “other side” of this would be: For any given subject, real potent unhappiness, anguish, grief, meaninglessness, and suffering, is worse than pretend/illusory or weak versions of those things. If I was mildly unhappy and unsatisfied, and there was never any way for this to turn into something good (like mild happiness or potent happiness), then it is better for me that I don’t exist at all. As I will hopefully make abundantly clear on this website, the nature of Existence is such that whether one is better off or not in an all-things-considered sense, depends on whether one is good or evil in an all-things-considered sense. Why else would it be good to be/choose good and evil to be/choose evil?